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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
security to the same extent as threats of violence." The Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion presumably will prompt the Virginia Assembly to amend the change-of-
name statute to provide a "good cause" exception for both prisoners and
probationers. 8-
The Barrett decision does not diminish the deference the Fourth Circuit
will accord the interests of prison officials.86 The Barrett court merely held
that limitations on inmates' first amendment rights should be no greater than
necessary to protect prison interests.87 While Barrett indicates that courts in
the fourth circuit will review restrictions on prisoners' basic freedoms,8 8 Bar-
rett also shows that courts will continue to defer to correctional officials when
the officials take reasonable steps to forestall major breakdowns in discipline




Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: Availability of Relief Under the '34
Act, Williams Act and RICO
In response to a hostile corporate takeover attempt, management may
use a number of defensive tactics to defeat a hostile tender offer.' One com-
"healthy sense of realism" and recognition that problems of prisons in America are intractable);
see also C. STAsTNY & G. TYRNAUER, WHO RuLEs TE JOINT 1, 1-7 (1982) (every prison in America
is potentially another Attica). See generally Gettinger, The Prison Population Boom: Still No
End in Sight, CoaRcTIONS MAO., June 1983, at 6 (from 1972 to 1982, United States has more
than doubled prison population due to post-war "baby boom," longer sentences, decreased paroles,
mandatory sentences, increased police and court efficiency, and renewed public interest in punish-
ment of criminals). Overcrowding combined with limited prison resources have made the search
for prison order enormously difficult. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-405 (1974)
(problems of prisons nearly unmanageable). Seen in this context, the deference courts pay to
prison authorities makes sense. Id. at 405.
84. See 689 F.2d at 502-503.
85. See id.; Brief for Appellee at 32, Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1982) (cen-
tral theme of district court's memorandum opinion was that change-of-name statute's rigidity
was fatal to its constitutionality under first amendment).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51 (explanation of why Barrett court refused
to concern itself with how prison officials decide to keep their records).
87. 689 F.2d at 502; seesupra text accompanying note 39 (least restrictive alternative language
from Jones).
88. 689 F.2d at 502; see supra notes 2 & 6 (Constitution protects prisoners' civil rights).
89. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977), construed
in 689 F.2d at 502; see supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining judiciary's wide-ranging
deference for decisions of prison officials).
1. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFrERs FoR COR'ORATE CONTROL 70 (1972)
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mon defensive tactic is the institution of legal proceedings in the form of a
request for preliminary injunctive relief to delay an offeror's takeover attempt.
2
In a request for a preliminary injunction, a target company's management
may allege a variety of violations of state and federal securities laws including
violation of the anti-fraud provisions of both the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act),3 the Williams Act,4 and violation of the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' The anti-fraud provisions of the '34
(tender offer is public offer to purchase securities of publicly held corporation during fixed period
of time at particular price or upon specified terms). Neither Congress nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has defined the term tender offer. Id. Congress and the SEC did not define
the term tender offer to preserve the flexibility of the SEC and the courts to make determinations
on a case by case basis. Id.
Persons seeking corporate control often use a cash tender offer to acquire a controlling in-
terest in a target company. See Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements
in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1104, 1105-06 (1969) (survey of preventive and
remedial defensive tactics used by management to contest tender offers) [hereinafter cited as Defen-
sive Tactics]; see also E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra at 219-76 (discussion of defensive tactics
to thwart tender offer); E. ARA.Now, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977) (defensive tactics to thwart tender offer). The
variety of defensive tactics that a target company's management may use to defend against a
hostile tender offer include repurchase of own shares by target, open market purchases of target's
shares by friendly third parties, concentrated selling of offeror's shares to friendly third parties,
dividend increases, stock splits, issuance of additional shares, creation of incompatibility between
target and offeror, defensive mergers, discriminatory voting provisions, triggering of state takeover
statutes, legal action, publicity and restrictive loan agreements. See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN,
supra, at 234-76 (manner by which defensive tactics successfully used and limitations upon tactics'
use).
2. See Defensive Tactics, supra note 1, at 1124 (institution of legal proceedings is effective
weapon in contested tender offer); see %so E. ARAow & H. EINHORN, supra note 1, at 266
(target corporation considers legal action in most contested tender offers); E. ARANOW, H. EtnogR
& G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 1, at 199 (defensive tactics include litigation challenging tender offer
as violative of variety of federal and state securities laws). A target company seeks to delay and
thereby frustrate a takeover attempt by seeking temporary injunctive relief. See Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir.) (target company filed suit for injuctive
relief to delay tender offer), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). A temporary injunction may frustrate
the acquisition of a target company since the offeror may decline the expense of a trial. Id. at
854. Additionally, even if the offeror persists, conditions may change so that the offer will fail
during the long lapse of time before full trial and appeal. Id. See Note, Tender Offer Regulation
- Injunction Standards Under the Williams Act, 45 FoaRDAM L. REv. 51, 53 (1976) (preliminary
injunction against tender offer effective defensive tactic) [hereinafter cited as Injunction Stan-
dards]; see also Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947
(2d Cir. 1969) (relief best given at time of application for preliminary injunction). If a target
company succeeds in obtaining a preliminary injunction against an attempted takeover, the con-
test for control ceases since it is practically impossible to renew a tender offer after a trial on
the merits. Injunction Standards, supra at 55; see Note, The Courts and The Williams Act: Try
a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 994, 1007-10 (1973) (preliminary injunction may
end battle for corporate control).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) ('34 Act).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982) (Williams Act). Congress enacted the Williams
Act to protect an investor faced with a decision to tender or retain shares. See 113 CONo. REC.
855-56 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (in contested tender offer, shareholders exposed to
bewildering variety of conflicting statements designed to persuade them to accept or reject offer).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1982); see Note, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and
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Act and the Williams Act prohibit the use of manipulative and deceptive devices
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security and in connection with
any tender offer. 6 The RICO statute prohibits the acquisition of an interest
in a business by funds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. 7 In
Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn,8 the Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether
a preliminary injunction to delay a takeover attempt should stand based upon
an incumbent management's allegations that an offeror violated federal
securities laws and the RICO statute.'
During 1982, investor Carl C. Icahn and several of his companies (Icahn)'"
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to Securities Violations, 8 J. CoRP. L. 411 (1983) (person
who commits securities fraud is not only liable under federal securities laws but also may be
liable under RICO) [hereinafter cited as RICO-Securities Violations].
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive device in
connection with purchase or sale of any security); id. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender offer).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). To invoke RICO's statutory provisions, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. Section 1961(5)
of RICO defines a pattern of racketeering activity as the commission of two predicate offenses
within ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). Despite the definition given in § 1961(5), one court
has concluded that the statutory definition of a pattern of racketeering activity is not an adequate
definition. See United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (§ 1961(5)
does not define pattern of racketeering activity). Since the RICO statute may define "pattern"
only in quantitative terms, courts have developed qualitative definitions. See United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 & n.23 (5th Cir.) (to constitute pattern of racketeering activity, two
predicate crimes need not be related to each other, but must be related to enterprise), cert. denied
439 U.S. 953 (1978); see also United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.) (enterprise
supplies significant unifying link between predicate acts), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 571 (1980); Spencer
Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361
at 92,215 n.4 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (each act in pattern of racketeering must be related to
enterprise); RICO-Securities Violations, supra note 5, at 432-33 (trend among courts to adopt
Elliott interpretation of pattern).
8. 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 280. Dan River claimed that Icahn intended to loot Dan River in violation of
Virginia's corporation law. Id. at 282; see VA. CODE §§ 13.1-71, 13.1-77, 13.1-81 (1950). Dan
River alleged that upon acquiring control of Dan River, Icahn would liquidate Dan River's assets
and then divert the cash to Icahn's use. See 701 F.2d at 278. The Fourth Circuit held that Dan
River had to prove that Icahn intended to self deal with Dan River's assets to prove that Icahn
violated state corporation or fiduciary duty laws. Id. at 291-92. The Dan River court noted that
Dan River's allegation that Icahn would divert Dan River's liquidated assets to personal use re-
quired serious proof because allegations of future wrongdoing might not support equitable relief
without additional proof. Id. at 292. The Fourth Circuit observed that the fact that Icahn may
have engaged in self-dealing in Icahn's use of an unregistered investment company to finance
previous takeover attempts did not entitle Dan River to assume that Icahn would self deal with
Dan River in a similar manner. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Dan River failed to show
a strong likelihood of success on Dan River's state claim since Dan River failed to prove that
Icahn's past wrongdoing would lead to future wrongdoing and because Dan River did not prove
that Icahn's past activity was unlawful. Id.
10, 701 F.2d at 280. In Dan River, the Fourth Circuit referred to the entire takeover group
as "Icahn". Id. The companies under Icahn's control included Icahn Holding Corporation, Icahn
Capital Corporation, Icahn & Co., Inc., Wolf Investors Plan, Inc., Brett Investors Corporation,
C.C.I. & Associates, Crane Associates, and Michelle Investors Corporation. Id. at 280 n.l.
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purchased Dan River" common stock on the open market. 2 Upon acquisi-
tion of more than five percent'3 of Dan River's outstanding shares, Icahn filed
with both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Dan River a
Schedule 13D disclosure statement.' 4 Icahn's 13D disclosure statement indicated
that Icahn intended to acquire control of Dan River.'" Undeterred by Dan
River's initial defensive tactics,' 6 Icahn proceeded with a takeover strategy
by offering to buy 3.1 million shares of Dan River common stock at eighteen
dollars per share subject to a condition that Dan River's management not
oppose Icahn's tender offer.'7 Icahn's offer stated that Icahn would purchase
only seven hundred thousand shares at fifteen dollars per share if Dan River's
management resisted Icahn's tender offer.' 8 Icahn then revised its stock pur-
chase offer for 3.1 million shares at eighteen dollars per share'9 to an offer
to buy two million shares at $16.50 per share.20 Dan River's management,
11. Id. Dan River, Inc. is a major textile manufacturer. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Originally the Williams Act required that a purchaser file a Schedule 13D disclosure
statement upon acquiring 10% of a company's equity security. See H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NaWs 5025, 5026 (acquisition of
1006 of company's securities triggers Williams Act's § 13(d) disclosure requirements). In 1970,
Congress amended the Williams Act to reduce the percentage of shares necessary to activate the
disclosure requirement from 10% to 5%. See Pub. L. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 § (a)(2) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976)) (beneficial owner of more than 5% of stock must
file Schedule 13D with issuer and SEC).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982) (information required on Schedule 13D); 17 C.F.R.
240.13d-101 (1983) (information included in Schedule 13D). Schedule 13D requires disclosure
of the background and identity of the beneficial owner of stock, the amount and source of the
funds used in making stock purchases, the extent of the purchaser's holdings, and, if the pur-
chaser intends to acquire control of the business, Schedule 13D requires disclosure of any plans
or proposals for change to the SEC and the issuer. Id.
15. See 701 F.2d at 280-81. Icahn's Schedule 13D indicated that if Icahn acquired control
of Dan River, Icahn would commit Dan River to an active course of transactions including a
possible merger with one of Icahn's controlled companies. Id.
16. Id. at 281. As a defensive response to Icahn's expressed intention to acquire control
of Dan River, Dan River issued 1.7 million shares of preferred stock to a new employee stock
bonus plan. Id. Dan River's stock bonus plan awarded preferred stock to employees on the basis
of an employee's salary. Id. Dan River's stock bonus plan gave the highest paid employees the
greatest amount of the preferred stock. Id. Management, being the highest paid employees, received
most of the preferred stock, thereby consolidating management's control over Dan River. Id.
Establishment of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) constitute a significant defensive tac-
tic for tender offer target corporations because a target may issue stock to an ESOP diluting
the voting strength of the offeror and increasing the number of shares that the offeror must
purchase to acquire control of the target. See E. ARaNow, H. EiNHoRN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 197-99 (tender offeror may not be able to obtain stock from employees because of
loyalty to employer or concern with job security).
17. See 701 F.2d at 282.
18. Id.
19. Id. On November 9, 1982, Icahn's first conditional offer of $18 per share lapsed by
the offer's own terms. Id. Under the terms of Icahn's revised tender offer, Icahn reserved the
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however, opposed Icahn's tender offer and filed suit in the District Court for
the Western District of Virginia seeking a preliminary injunction to block
Icahn's revised stock purchase offer.21 The district court enjoined Icahn from
exercising any rights in the shares Icahn had purchased and would purchase
in the tender offer.22 Icahn appealed the district court's order sterilizing Icahn's
shares.23 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's preliminary
injunction sterilizing Icahn's shares.
24
In determining whether the district court should have granted Dan River's
request for a preliminary injunction, the Fourth Circuit limited its decision
to whether Dan River demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits that Icahn violated federal and state securities laws and the RICO
statute.2" The Dan River court first examined Dan River's claim that the court
should enjoin Icahn from exercising any rights in the acquired Dan River stock
because Icahn had violated the federal securities laws.26 Dan River alleged
that Icahn's ultimatum that Icahn would offer less for Dan River's shares
if Dan River's management opposed the offer violated the '34 Act's prohibi-
tion against the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.27 Dan River claimed that Icahn's ultimatum
strategy amounted to an extortionate threat.28 The Fourth Circuit noted that
21. Id.
22. Id. In a portion of the district court's decision not appealed by either Icahn or Dan
River, the district court allowed Icahn's tender offer to proceed subject to an extension of the
offer's withdrawal date by one week. Id. The district court also ordered Icahn to correct incon-
sistencies in Icahn's disclosure statements. Id.
23. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976) (courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review in-
terlocutory orders of district courts).
24. 701 F.2d at 292.
25. Id. at 284-92. The Fourth Circuit standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief
is the balance of hardships test. See North Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Dart Containerline
Co., 592 F.2d 749, 750 (4th Cir. 1979). In Dart Containerline, the Fourth Circuit held that four
factors determine whether a court should grant or withhold preliminary injunctive relief. Id. In
deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court must examine plaintiff's likelihood
of success on the merits, plaintiff's possibility of suffering an irreparable harm, defendant's prob-
able injury, and the public interest. Id. The Dart Containerline court held that a court must weigh
the likelihood of plaintiff's success on the merits against plaintiff's probability of irreparable
injury. Id. If the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiff
need not demonstrate the probability of irreparable harm. Id. Conversely, if plaintiff does not
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiff must demonstrate the pro-
bability of irreparable injury. Id.; see Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir.
1980) (likelihood of success on merits increases in importance as harm to plaintiff decreases when
balanced against harm to defendant). The Dan River court concluded that the balance of hard-
ships between Dan River's probability of suffering irreparable harm and Icahn's probable injury
did not weigh in Dan River's favor and therefore Dan River must show a strong likelihood of
success on the merits to support a request for preliminary injunctive relief. 701 F.2d at 284.
26. 701 F.2d at 284-85.
27. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting use of manipulative device in connection
with purchase or sale of securities).
28. 701 F.2d at 285. Dan River alleged that Icahn's takeover strategy constituted an extor-
tionate threat because Icahn's strategy forced the company to buy Icahn out at a considerable
profit to Icahn or face a takeover by Icahn. Id. at 284-85; see infra text accompanying notes
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Dan River might have trouble establishing standing to sue under the market
manipulation claims because under section 10(b) 9 and rule lOb-5'0 of the '34
Act only buyers and sellers of securities have standing to sue. 3' The court
acknowledged that a question of fact existed as to whether or not Dan River
sold securities during the allegedly manipulative period and therefore concluded
that Dan River had not demonstrated sufficient likelihood of standing to sue.
32
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stated that for Dan River to bring a claim
under the '34 Act's prohibition against market manipulation, Dan River must
prove that Icahn intended to deceive Dan River shareholders by artificially
affecting the price of Dan River stock. 33 The Dan River court, however, held
that Dan River's claim that Icahn's ultimatum strategy was similar to an
extortion threat would probably fail in a trial on the merits because Dan River
did not demonstrate that Icahn conducted the takeover strategy with the re-
quisite intent to deceive Dan River stockholders.3 4 Moreover, the court stated
that Dan River's extortion threat claim would probably fail at trial because
34-35 (Dan River court did not accept Dan River's claim that Icahn's takeover strategy could
be likened to extortion).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 78j(b) prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive
device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Section 240.10b-5 prohibits fraudulent practices in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.
31. 701 F.2d at 285; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive
devices in connection with purchase or sale of any security); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (pro-
hibiting fraudulent practices in connection with purchase or sale of any security); see Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-55 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers have
standing to sue under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 193 F.2d 461,
464 (2d Cir.) (only purchaser or seller may sue under rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court adopted the Birnbaum rule that only purchasers
and sellers may sue as a limitation on standing to sue for damages under the '34 Act's prohibition
against manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 421 U.S. at 755;
see Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 464 (rule lob-5 protection extended only to
defrauded purchaser or seller). The Blue Chip Stamps court limited standing to purchasers or
sellers of securities to avoid the risk of strike suits by persons suffering no actual injury. 421
U.S. at 740-43. The Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller rule commands a wide acceptance by
the courts. See Haber v. Kobrin, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP (CCH) 99,259,
at 96,162 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1983) (only purchasers and sellers have standing under § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5); Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772,
at 93,920 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982) (language of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 clearly requires purchase
or sale as prerequisite to liability).
32. 701 F.2d at 285.
33. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) ('34 Act); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 195-99 (1976) (manipulative conduct under '34 Act defined as intent to deceive);
see also Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1313 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (no substantial likelihood
of success on merits where no intent to deceive in allegedly manipulative tender offer and merger).
34. See 701 F.2d at 285. In Dan River the Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress enacted
§ 10(b) of the '34 Act to ensure full disclosure to shareholders. Id. Since Icahn had made full
disclosure of Icahn's takeover ultimatum, the court concluded that Dan River could not allege
a violation of the '34 Act's prohibition against manipulation in the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity. Id. The court held that to prohibit Icahn's "extraordinarily frank" disclosure would be con-
trary to congressional intent and against public policy. Id.; see infra text accompanying note
102 (prohibiting frank disclosure might encourage nondisclosure).
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Dan River failed to demonstrate that Icahn's strategy constituted a form of
blackmail. 3- The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that Icahn's ultimatum was
not necessarily unlawful because Icahn's strategy only placed Dan River on
the defensive.
36
In addition to alleging that Icahn's tender offer strategy was a manipulative
and deceptive device, Dan River alleged that Icahn violated the '34 Act's
disclosure requirements by failing to disclose a contingent obligation of five
million dollars. 3 1 Icahn had omitted to disclose a five million dollar bank loan
to an outside company guaranteed by Icahn Capital, one of Icahn's controlled
companies. 38 The Dan River court examined whether Icahn's five million dollar
omission violated the '34 Act's disclosure requirement under the standard of
materiality. 39 Under the standard of materiality a court will hold that a failure
to disclose a fact violates the '34 Act's disclosure requirements if the non-
disclosed fact is a material fact that assumes actual significance to a reasonable
shareholder. 4 The court concluded that a trial court would probably not find
that Icahn's contingent liability of five million dollars was significant to a
reasonable shareholder because the liability did not alter Icahn's ability to
proceed with the tender offer. 41 The Dan River court, therefore, admonished
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 285-86. In Dan River the Fourth Circuit noted that even Dan River agreed that
Icahn's ability to conduct the tender offer stood unimpaired by a $5 million contingent liability.
Id. at 286. Dan River, however, claimed that Dan River stockholders would find Icahn's con-
tingent liability material to the stockholders' decisions whether to tender. Id.
38. Id.; see supra note 10 (list of Icahn's controlled companies involved in takeover group).
39. 701 F.2d at 286. In Dan River, the court concluded that Icahn's $5 million contingent
liability was probably not a material omission based on the Supreme Court's definition of materiality
as applied in the context of Rule 14a-9, a violation of the proxy rules. Id.; see TSC Indus.,
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (standard of materiality is whether a fact would
assume actual significance to a reasonable shareholder); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983)
(prohibiting omission of material fact in proxy statements). In TSC Industries, the Supreme Court
resolved the controversy surrounding the definition of materiality. 426 U.S. at 449. The Supreme
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the court had adopted the wrong standard of
materiality. Id. at 463-64. The Seventh Circuit had ruled that a material omission was defined
as an omission that a reasonable shareholder might consider important. See Northway, Inc. v.
TSC Indus., 512 F.2d 324, 330-33 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The Supreme
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that a material fact is a fact that a reasonable shareholder
would consider important. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. Most courts have
held that the Supreme Court's definition of materiality as used in Rule 14a-9 applies equally
in the tender offer context. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 289 (7th Cir.)
(TSC Industries' materiality standard applies to Schedule 13D nondisclosure), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); see also E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLsTEIN, supra note 1, at 57 (TSC
Industries' materiality standard applies not only to Rule 14a-9 proxy violations but also to other
securities laws); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 945 (N.D. I11. 1982) (omitted fact
material if substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider fact important
in voting decision).
40. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (material fact one that
reasonable shareholder would consider important in voting decision).
41. See 701 F.2d at 286. Although conforming to the majority view, the Dan River court's
materiality standard should not have caused the summary disposition of Icahn's alleged $5 million
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the district court for ordering the sterilization of Icahn's Dan River shares,
and held that full disclosure was the appropriate remedy for inadequate
disclosure.4 2 The Dan River court concluded that the district court's steriliza-
tion order was inappropriate and inequitable because the order needlessly
burdened Icahn for the one allegedly material nondisclosure.
43
In a third allegation, Dan River claimed that Icahn's two-tier tender offer
represented an illegal "bait and switch" operation in violation of the Williams
Act's prohibition against manipulative schemes in connection with any tender
offer.4 4 A bait and switch operation is a scheme whereby an offeror offers
to buy stock at a higher price, inducing stockholders to tender on the offeror's
alternative lower price. 4 Dan River alleged that Icahn's first offer to buy 3.1
million shares of Dan River at eighteen dollars per share represented bait de-
signed to lure shareholders and that Icahn's second offer to purchase only
seven hundred thousand Dan River shares at fifteen dollars per share
represented a switch that shareholders would be forced to accept if manage-
ment resisted the first offer. 46 Dan River claimed that Icahn's two-tier offer
constituted manipulation because Icahn knew that Dan River's management
would resist Icahn's offer and therefore Icahn's first offer would induce Dan
River's shareholders to tender on Icahn's second offer.47
Addressing Dan River's bait and switch allegation, the Fourth Circuit first
examined whether Dan River's claim that Icahn's two-tier offer was
contingent liability as immaterial prior to a trial on the merits. See 701 F.2d at 292-93 (Butzner,
J., dissenting). At a full scale trial on the merits, a juror could conclude that a reasonable shareholder
would consider a $5 million contingent liability important in deciding how to vote. See id. at
292 (dissent noted than $5 million contingent liability represented 39% of Icahn Capital's net
worth). The Dan River dissent stated that Icahn's contingent liability could be converted into
an actual liability because Icahn controlled both the debtor and guarantor. Id. at 293. The deben-
tures which Icahn would issue to Dan River's stockholders in the proposed merger could be subor-
dinated to the contingent liability. Id.
42. Id. at 286. In Dan River, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Dan River's best remedy
was an injunction against Icahn's tender offer until Icahn corrected the disclosure statement.
Id. The court, however, noted that Dan River did not pursue a remedy requiring greater disclosure
but instead requested sterilization of Icahn's Dan River shares. Id. at 286-87. The Fourth Circuit
noted that the district court's order disenfranchising Icahn's shares did not provide greater disclosure
but instead protected Dan River's management from a challenge by Icahn for control of the
company. Id. at 287.
43. Id. The Dan River court balanced the harm caused to Dan River by the district court's
order disenfranchising Icahn's shares against the harm to Dan River caused by Icahn's one allegedly
material nondisclosure and concluded that the district court invoked the court's equitable powers
to produce an inequitable result. Id.; see also note 25 (discussing balance of hardships test).
44. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting untrue statement of material fact or
omission of fact with respect to tender offer); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366
(6th Cir. 1981); see also Note, Hostile Tender Offers and Injuctive Relieffor 14(e) Manipulation
Claims: Developments Since Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 40 WAsH. & LE L. REv. 1175,
1197 (1983) (Dan River illustrates federal courts' reluctance to extend Mobil court's § 14(e) manipula-
tion analysis to tender offers) [hereinafter cited as Developments Since Mobil].
45. See Developments Since Mobil, supra note 44, at 1195 (definition of "bait-and-switch"
in tender offer context).
46. See 701 F.2d at 287-88.
47. Id.
19841
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
manipulative in itself stated a claim for relief under the Williams Act's provi-
sions prohibiting manipulative schemes.48 Indicating that the sole purpose of
the Williams Act's manipulative provisions was to ensure adequate disclosure
to stockholders, the court expressed serious doubt that Dan River stated a
claim under section 14(e) 9 of the Williams Act since Icahn had fully disclosed
his takeover strategy." Section 14(e) of the Williams Act prohibited fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender
offer." The court noted that even if section 14(e) allowed claims against the
substance of a tender offer, Dan River still must overcome a considerable
burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits that Icahn's strategy
was a manipulative scheme.2 The court stated that the mere fact that a tender
offer affects the market price of a security does not mean that the tender
offer impermissibly manipulates the market." The Dan River court stated that
a ruling that activity affecting the market price of a security constitutes
manipulation would lead to a prohibition against all tender offers since all
tender offers affect the market.-
4
In addition to Dan River's allegations that Icahn violated federal securities
laws, Dan River alleged that Icahn acquired an interest in Dan River with
funds derived through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO.5
Dan River asserted that Icahn violated RICO by failing to comply with a pro-
vision of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA),"' which required all
investment companies to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission." Dan River argued that Icahn transformed Bayswater Realty
and Capital Corporation (Bayswater) into an investment company and know-
ingly failed to register Bayswater with the SEC in violation of the ICA." Dan
River asserted that Icahn used Bayswater's assets to finance acquisitions of
Dan River's securities, thereby triggering the RICO claim. 9
To assert a claim under the RICO statute, a plaintiff must prove the com-
48. Id.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting untrue statement of material fact or omission
of fact with respect to tender offer).
50. 701 F.2d at 288; see Hearings on S. 50 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1969) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman, SEC) (primary purpose of Williams Act to provide shareholders with adequate
information).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
52. See 701 F.2d at 288.
53. Id.; see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 627-33 (D. Md.
1982) (plaintiff must prove material nondisclosure to sustain claim of manipulation).
54. 701 F.2d at 288. In Dan River, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that all tender offers
inject an element of uncertainty into the marketplace. Id. The court noted that most tender offers
include conditions which make acceptance of the offer uncertain. Id.
55. Id. at 289; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982) (RICO provision prohibiting acquisition
of interest in business through funds derived from pattern of racketeering activity).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1, et. seq. (1982).





mission of two predicate acts of racketeering.6" Dan River alleged that Icahn
committed the predicate offense of securities fraud by using Bayswater's assets
in two previous takeover attempts. 6 ' Dan River argued that Bayswater could
not give Icahn authority to use Bayswater's funds since Icahn did not register
Bayswater with the SEC.62 Dan River, therefore, contended that Icahn
misrepresented the Icahn group's authority to use Bayswater's assets, thereby
committing securities fraud. 63 Dan River also alleged that Icahn violated the
federal mail fraud statute 6' because Carl C. Icahn, as an officer of Bayswater,
violated his fiduciary duty to Bayswater's shareholders and concealed material
information in the process. 65 The federal mail fraud statute prohibits use of
the postal service to obtain money or property through fraudulent
misrepresentations.66 Dan River contended that Icahn's securities fraud and
mail fraud offenses constituted a pattern of racketeering activity in violation
of the RICO statute.
67
Before addressing Dan River's probability of prevailing at trial on Icahn's
alleged RICO violations, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the RICO
statute granted private parties a cause of action for equitable relief.6 The court
noted that although RICO expressly granted a private plaintiff a right of action
for treble damages69 and that RICO expressly authorized the United States
Attorney General to prosecute a case for equitable relief,70 any private right
of action for injunctive relief under RICO must arise by implication from
the RICO statute since the language of the statute did not expressly provide
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). Section 1961(5) of the RICO statute defines a pattern
of racketeering activity as requiring at least two criminal acts, one act occurring after the effec-
tive date of the RICO statute and one act occurring within ten years of the prior act of racketeer-
ing activity. Id. Section 1961(1) of the RICO statute defines racketeering activity by listing a
large number of crimes commonly associated with organized crime. 15 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
Section 1961(1) of the RICO statute, however, also includes a number of offenses committed
by persons who are not members of organized crime. Id. The RICO statute's failure to limit
the statute's list of predicate offenses commonly associated with members of organized crime
has led the majority of courts to conclude that a link to organized crime is not a necessary prere-
quisite to alleging a RICO violation. See infra note 130 (courts holding that RICO does not re-
quire link to organized crime); see also RICO-Securities Violations, supra note 5, at 413-14 (courts
not limiting application of RICO to members of organized crime due to § 1961(1) broad list
of crimes).
61. See 701 F.2d at 290. Icahn used Bayswater's funds as part of a pool of assets used
to finance acquisitions in the target companies. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (prohibiting use of postal service to defraud).
65. See 701 F.2d at 290.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
67. See 701 F.2d at 290.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (any person injured by violation of § 1962 of RICO
may sue for treble damages, court costs and attorney's fees); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982)
(prohibiting acquisition of interest in a business through funds derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982) (Attorney General may prosecute RICO claim and court
may grant injunction).
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private individuals with a right to equitable relief.7" The court, however, con-
cluded that recent Supreme Court cases holding that legislative intent deter-
mined whether a private right of action arose by implication from a statute,
71. See 701 F.2d at 290; see also S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Senate version
of the RICO bill sent to the House for approval did not include a private right of action for
damages. Id. The final House version of the RICO bill, however, included a private right of
action to sue and to recover treble damages plus court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. See
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 15-21, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEws 4007, 4010 (RICO statute including private right of action for damages). But see 116
CoNG. Rac. 35346 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) (proposing amendment to RICO statute).
In the floor debate, Representative Sam Steiger offered an amendment to the RICO statute to
clarify the procedure to be followed in a private action. Id. Although Congressman Steiger withdrew
the amendment, Steiger clearly expressed the belief that the RICO statute, without the Steiger
amendment, provided a private right to injunctive relief. See id. at 35346-47 (RICO statute pro-
vides private right of action for injunctive relief); see also Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP.
L.Q. 1009, 1014, 1047 n.197 (1980) (RICO authorizes private parties to seek injunctive relief,
treble damages plus costs, and reasonable attorney's fees).
Holding that RICO did not expressly grant private plaintiffs a right to injunctive relief, the
Dan River court concluded that to state a claim for equitable relief, a plaintiff must prove that
a private right of action for injunctive relief arose by implication from the RICO statute. 701
F.2d at 290. The Supreme Court has ruled that in the absence of legislative intent to provide
an additional remedy, if a statute provides a particular remedy, courts should not imply an addi-
tional remedy. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 15 (1981) (courts compelled to conclude that Congress provided appropriate remedy in absence
of contrary congressional intent); Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (central
inquiry in deciding whether statute provides private right of action is whether Congress intended
to create private right of action). While the RICO statute provides particular remedies for viola-
tions of its provisions, the Dan River court failed to examine RICO's legislative history to decide
whether Congress intended to provide any additional remedies to the remedies provided in the
RICO statute. See 701 F.2d at 290. Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dan River that
the RICO statute did not grant private parties an express right of action for injunctive relief,
the Southern District of New York, in Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, examined the RICO
statute's grant of relief in the securities context. See Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, 561 F.
Supp. 301, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (examining claim for injunctive relief under RICO).
In Trane, plaintiff air conditioning equipment manufacturer brought an action against a
risk arbitrage group alleging market manipulation, unfair and inadequate disclosures, and viola-
tion of the RICO statute. See id. at 303-04. The Trane court expressed serious doubt whether
the RICO statute provided plaintiffs a private right of action for injunctive relief. Id. at 307,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982) (RICO). The Trane court found only one case granting a private
party injunctive relief under RICO. See 561 F. Supp. at 306. The Trane court cited Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) an opinion read into the record
from the bench, as the only case granting a private plaintiff injunctive relief under the RICO
statute. 561 F. Supp. at 306. According to the Trane court, however, Aetna granted a preliminary
injunction without addressing the issue regarding the suitability of injunctive relief for private
plaintiffs under RICO. Id. The Trane court concluded that the Aetna court implicitly assumed
the availability of a private right of action for equitable availability of d private right of action
for equitable relief under RICO, and therefore the Trane court declined to follow the Aetna
decision. Id. at 307. Instead, the Trane court approvingly noted the Fourth Circuit's reservations
as to whether RICO granted injunctive relief to private plaintiffs alleging a RICO violation. Id.
The Trane court, however, did not decide whether RICO provided a private right of action for
injunctive relief, concluding that since the defendants did not engage in market manipulation,
the defendants could not violate RICO. Id.
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undermined Dan River's claim that a private right of action for equitable relief
arose by implication from the RICO statute." The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
considered Dan River's probability of success unlikely on a claim that private
injunctive relief might arise by implication from RICO.
7 3
The Dan River court next held that even if RICO provided plaintiffs a
private right of action for injunctive relief, Dan River must prove that Icahn
had a criminal intent in failing to register Bayswater with the SEC to prove
either the mail fraud or the securities fraud charges. 71 The court found that
Icahn rebutted any inference of criminal intent by establishing that Icahn con-
stantly monitored Bayswater and that Icahn relied upon counsel's advice that
registration was unnecessary.75
Finally, the Fourth Circuit expressed serious reservations as to whether
Congress intended RICO to provide injured parties an additional remedy against
securities fraud.7 6 The Dan River court noted that Congress enacted RICO
to combat organized crime, not to regulate corporate takeovers.7 7 The court
stated that since Congress may not have intended RICO to provide relief for
securities fraud, Dan River could not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits to support equitable relief.78 The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that Dan River failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of prevail-
ing on the merits on any of Dan River's federal and state securities claims
72. Id.; see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S.
1, 15 (1981) (in absence of contrary congressional intent, where statute provides particular remedy
court should avoid reading other remedies into statute); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 573-75 (1979) (congressional intent essential to whether private right of action implied
from statute). In Touche Ross, the Supreme Court examined whether a private right of action
was available under § 17(a) of the '34 Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982). The Court observed
that Congress enacted § 18(a) of the '34 Act to provide the exclusive remedy for misstatements
in any reports filed with the SEC, including reports filed pursuant to § 17(a) of the '34 Act.
442 U.S. at 573-75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982). The Court held
that the central inquiry as to whether a private right of action arises by implication from a statute
focuses on congressional intent to create a private right of action. 442 U.S. at 573-75. The Touche
Ross Court concluded that since Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under
§ 17(a), no private right of action could arise by implication from the statute. Id. The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's current reluctance to imply a private right of action
from a statute. 701 F.2d at 290 (current Supreme Court authority supports conclusion that Dan
River may fail to state a claim for injunctive relief under RICO); see Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981) (Congress must intend to provide
remedy); Touche Ross v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (congressional intent key to whether
remedy available).
73. See 701 F.2d at 290.
74. See id. at 291.
75. Id.; see Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1961) (reliance on attorney's
advice rebuts inference of criminal intent), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 952 (1962).
76. See 701 F.2d at 291.
77. Id. In Dan River, the Fourth Circuit stated that Congress did not enact RICO to attack
the problems of corporate control and risk arbitrage. Id.
78. Id. The Dan River court did not examine the legislative history of the RICO statute
before concluding that RICO does not apply to securities violations. Id.; see also supra note
71 (legislative history of RICO).
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or on Dan River's RICO allegation. 9 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, reversed
the district court's injunction against Icahn.8"
Although the Dan River court held that only purchasers or sellers of
securities have standing to sue under section 10(b) of the '34 Act, several courts
have allowed exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule. 1 For example, in Hanna
Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.," the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio recently granted standing to a target com-
pany to sue an offeror under section 10(b).8 3 In Hanna Mining, an issuer filed
for preliminary relief to enjoin a tender offer claiming that the offeror's
misleading Schedule 13D Disclosure Statement constituted a fraudulent and
manipulative device.84 While several courts have granted a target company
standing to sue a tender offeror for violating the disclosure provisions of sec-
79. 701 F.2d at 284.
80. Id. at 280. The Dan River opinion contained a lengthy dissent. Id. at 292-95. The Dan
River dissent concluded that Dan River demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits to support a preliminary injunction. Id. at 294. Since Icahn failed to disclose a loan guarantee
obligation that represented approximately thirty-nine percent of Icahn Capital's net worth in
accordance with proper accounting procedures, the dissent concluded that Icahn's disclosure state-
ment was presumably misleading or inaccurate. Id. at 292-93. The dissent argued that because
Icahn proposed a merger between Dan River and Icahn by the issuance of debentures, the deben-
tures might be subordinated to the contingent debt liability. Id. at 293. Thus, the dissent found
Icahn's nondisclosure a material omission in violation of § 14(e) of the Williams Act. Id.; see
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting untrue statements of material fact or omissions of fact
with respect to tender offer). The dissent also concluded that Icahn violated § 14(e) of the Williams
Act because Icahn's two-tier tender offer constituted an illegal bait and switch operation. 701
F.2d at 293. The Dan River dissent observed that Dan River presented evidence that Icahn knew
that Dan River would oppose Icahn's $18 per share conditional tender offer. Id. Dan River proved
that Icahn knew that the first offer, being an illusion, would induce Dan River's shareholders
to tender on the second, lower offer of $15 per share. Id. The dissent contended that Icahn must
rebut Dan River's evidence to prove that Icahn's two-tier offer did not constitute an illegal bait
and switch operation. Id.
Furthermore, the dissenting opinion asserted that since Carl C. Icahn stated that he would
dismiss the action on the merits upon assuming control of Dan River, Dan River demonstrated
a probability of irreparable harm in support of Dan River's application for injunctive relief.
Id.; see supra note 25 (balance of hardships test). The dissenting opinion emphasized that a con-
sideration of the public interest required an inquiry into the means Icahn used to advance its
takeover goals. See 701 F.2d at 294-95. The dissent contended that the court would best serve
the public interest by maintaining the status quo until a resolution on the merits. Id. at 295.
Finally, the dissent concluded that the district court's order disenfranchising Icahn's shares pro-
vided an appropriate remedy by preventing future harm to Dan River. Id.
81. See Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978) (pension trust fund beneficiaries
have standing under rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Heyman v. Heyman, 356
F. Supp. 958, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (trust beneficiaries have standing under rule lOb-5); see also
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (prohibiting use of manipulative and deceptive devices in connec-
tion with any securities transactions).
82. [1982 Transfer Binder] FEE. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
83. See id. at 94,592 (target company has standing under rule 10b-5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1983) (prohibiting use of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with purchase or
sale of any security).
84. See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 98,878 at 94,592.
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tion 13(d) of the Williams Act,85 only the Hanna Mining court has granted
a target company standing to sue a tender offeror for violating section 10(b). 86
The Hanna Mining court held that a target company had standing to seek
injunctive relief even though the company was not a purchaser or seller of
securities.87 The court held that the target company was the most appropriate
party to assert a violation of the '34 Act's antifraud provisions on behalf of
the company's shareholders because the target company was the only party
possessing the offeror's misleading statements.88 The Hanna Mining court,
therefore, granted standing to Hanna Mining under section 10(b) of the '34
Act's antifraud provisions and under SEC rule 10b-5.19
In addition to the purchaser-seller rule exception that the party best situated
to seek relief has standing to sue, some courts have allowed an injunction
exception to the purchaser-seller rule.90 In Cowin v. Bressler,9' the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the purchaser-seller rule
of section 10(b) did not apply in a suit for injunctive relief because the
purchaser-seller rule applied only in private damages actions. 92 In Cowan, a
85. See Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F. 2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980) (target cor-
poration has standing to seek relief enjoining violation of § 13(d)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101
(1981); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 1979) (issuer
has standing to require full disclosure under § 13(d)); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556
F.2d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 1977) (target corporation has standing to maintain private right of action
for injunctive relief under § 13(d)); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971)
(issuer has standing under § 13(d) to seek relief if false filing), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976) (Schedule 13D filing requirement).
86. See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,878 at 94,592 (N.D. Ohio
June 11, 1982). Relying on a narrow exception to the purchaser-seller rule, the Hanna Mining
court stated that an issuer may have standing because an issuer is often the most appropriate
party to assert a rule lOb-5 violation. See id. at 94,592 (GAF Corp. 's reasoning for purchaser-
seller exception under § 13(d) supports issuer standing under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5); see also
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971) (issuer might have standing if issuer
most appropriate party to seek relief on behalf of issuer's shareholders).
87. See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 98,878, at 94,592.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1976) (narrow
injunction exception to purchaser-seller rule where preventive relief appropriate); Davis v. Davis,
526 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (5th Cir. 1976) (injunction exception to purchaser seller rule because strict
insistence on purchase or sale not as critical in suit for injunctive relief as in suit for damages).
91. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 98,383 (D.C.D.C. Dec. 23, 1981).
92. Id. at 92,376-77 (injunction exception to purchaser-seller rule entitled minority shareholders
to standing under rule lOb-5); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 725,
730-31 (1975) (only purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue under § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5; supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (definition of § 10b and rule 1Ob-5). The
Cowin court noted that the Supreme Court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps that only purchasers
or sellers of securities could assert standing under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 applied only to private
damage actions. See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,393, at 92,376-77
(Blue Chip Stamps's purchaser-seller rule not applied to actions for injunctive relief); see also
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 725, 730-31 (purchaser seller rule applied
in private damages action).
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minority shareholder sought injunctive relief against a company to require
disclosure of allegedly material information. 3 Defendants objected to plain-
tiff's claim, arguing that plaintiff lacked standing to sue because plaintiff neither
purchased nor sold securities in connection with the alleged fraudulent acts. 94
The Cowan court held that judicial endorsement of the injunction exception
to the purchaser-seller rule coupled with a policy of encouraging private litigants
to supplement SEC enforcement actions supported the court's grant of stan-
ding to a minority shareholder seeking an injunction to require disclosure. 9
The Dan River court should have applied the Hanna Mining court's holding
that the party best situated to assert a violation of the antifraud provisions
of the '34 Act has standing to sue.9 6 The Dan River court, therefore, should
have granted standing to the plaintiff target company. Dan River was in the
best position to prosecute a claim for injunctive relief on behalf of Dan River's
shareholders because Dan River had better knowledge of Icahn's alleged viola-
tions and greater resources to maintain a suit for equitable relief. The Dan
River court, however, should not have granted standing to Dan River under
a general injunction exception to the purchaser-seller rule. 97 The injunctive
exception is designed to provide preventive relief in cases where no actual pur-
chase or sale transaction has been completed.9 8 In Dan River, the plaintiff
did not seek to enjoin Icahn's tender offer but instead sought to disenfran-
chise Icahn's shares of Dan River common stock. 99
The Fourth Circuit also noted that Dan River must prove that Icahn ac-
tually intended to deceive Dan River's investors, because the Supreme Court
has held that a private cause of action will lie under the section 10(b) an-
tifraud provision of the '34 Act and SEC rule lOb-5 only in the presence of
scienter, an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.' 0 The Supreme Court
93. See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,393, at 92,375-76 (re-
questing injunctive relief to require disclosure of allegedly material information).
94. Id. at 92, 376.
95. See id. at 92,376-77 (policy of encouraging private enforcement actions supports in-
junction exception to purchaser-seller rule).
96. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (issuer in best position to assert violation
of anti-fraud provisions of '34 Act and SEC rules promulgated thereunder).
97. See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1976) (denying
injunction exception to purchaser-seller rule where actual purchase or sale completed). In Tully,
the Third Circuit qualified the injunction exception to the purchaser-seller rule by limiting application
of the injunction exception to situations where the exception's preventive purpose could be achieved.
Id. The plaintiffs in Tully sought not to enjoin a purchase or sale of securities but instead re-
quested disenfranchisement of defendant's shares to undo the effects of a completed transaction.
Id. The Tully court concluded that the injunction exception to the purchaser-seller rule could
not grant plaintiffs standing to allege a violation of the '34 Act's antifraud prohibitions. Id.
The situation presented in Tully is analogous to the situation in Dan River. Dan River could
not rely on an injunction exception to the purchaser-seller rule since Dan River did not seek
to enjoin Icahn's tender offer but instead sought sterilization of Icahn's shares. Id.; see also
701 F.2d at 282.
98. See 540 F.2d at 194-95.
99. See 701 F.2d at 287.
100. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-215 (1976) (private cause of action
for damages under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 will not lie in absence of scienter, defined as intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud).
[Vol. 41:491
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
has extended the scienter requirement to SEC injunctive proceedings.'"' The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, in compliance with the scienter requirement found
no evidence of an intent to deceive investors. 2 In fact, the court observed
the "potential irony" in finding Icahn's "extraordinarily frank" disclosure
a violation of rule lOb-5 because such a finding might only encourage less,
rather than full disclosure of an offeror's intentions." 3
The Fourth Circuit cited Radol v. Thomas"0 4 in support of the proposi-
tion that a two tier tender offer would not violate section 14(e) of the Williams
Act.' 5 The Dan River court, however, failed to analogize Radol to Dan
River. 6 In Radol, plaintiff Marathon Oil shareholders sought to enjoin a
proposed merger between Marathon and U. S. Steel, alleging that the "front-
end loaded" price structure of U. S. Steel's tender offer and merger created
artificial market influences in violation of section 14(e) of the Williams Act.' 7
Front-end loaded offers propose one price for the actual tender offer and a
second price for a subsequent merger.1°8 The Radol plaintiffs claimed that
U. S. Steel's front-end loaded offer manipulated the price of Marathon's
securities by coercing Marathon shareholders into tendering their shares to
avoid the risk of being forced to accept a lower price in the form of cash
or a stock trade in the subsequent merger.'0 9 Although the Radol court defined
manipulation as intent to deceive investors by artificially affecting the price
of securities,"O the Radol court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of proving at trial that U. S. Steel's two-
price offer manipulated the price of Marathon stock by coercing Marathon
shareholders into tendering."' The court held that it was unlikely that the
two-tier structure interfered with the market of other potential offerors for
Marathon stock."2 ' Although faiiing to analogize Radol to Dan River, the
Fourth Circuit might have relied on Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. ",3 to
demonstrate that Icahn's two-tier offer was manipulative." '4
In Mobil, the target corporation, Marathon, granted U. S. Steel, a white
knight," ' an option to purchase up to ten million shares of Marathon for
101. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (scienter requirement necessary in SEC
injunctive proceedings for violation of rule 10b-5).
102. See 701 F.2d at 285.
103. Id.
104. 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
105. See Dan River, 701 F.2d at 289 n.ll.
106. Id.
107. See Radol, 534 F. Supp. at 1311.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) ("manipulation" virtually
a term of art in securities context).
111. See Radol, 534 F. Supp. at 1312-13.
112. Id.
113. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
114. See Dan River, 701 F.2d at 288 n.10.
115. See Polinsky v. MCA Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1290 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (white knight defined
as friendly corporation engaged by target company to make a tender offer at a higher price than
original unfriendly tender offeror's bid). A target company locates a white knight to protect the
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ninety dollars per share, and an option to purchase Marathon's interest in
the Yates Oil field for $2.8 billion, if U. S. Steel's tender offer failed and
another corporation succeeded in acquiring a majority interest in Marathon." 6
The Sixth Circuit held that the "lock-up" agreement violated section 14(e)
of the Williams Act." 7 A lock up arrangement is an offer of an exclusive
right to one contestant which would discourage higher bids from other
contestants." 8 The Mobil court concluded that the lock-up options imposed
an artificial price ceiling on the tender offer market for Marathon shares and
therefore constituted a manipulative act under the Williams Act." 9
The Fourth Circuit distinguished the Mobil decision on the grounds that
the Mobil lock-up agreement was an artificial manipulation outside the securities
marketplace while the situation in Dan River was an offer in the securities
marketplace. 2 ' The Fourth Circuit instead examined the analogous situation
presented in Cities Service Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.'2' in which an offeror
made a friendly offer which management rejected, followed by a hostile offer
at a lower price.2 2 In Cities Service Co., the acquirer offered to buy forty-six
percent of the target's shares at fifty dollars per share.2 3 When target manage-
ment rejected the friendly offer, the acquirer offered to purchase fifteen per-
cent of the target's shares at forty-five dollars per share with an option to
purchase more than fifteen percent.' 24 The target sought preliminary injunc-
tive relief in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
alleging that the acquirer's first offer induced shareholders into believing that
the acquirer could afford to purchase at least forty-six percent at fifty dollars
per share and that consequently, shareholders would tender on the lower offer
believing that the acquirer would purchase more than fifteen percent.' 25 The
Cities Service Co. court held that the tender offer probably did not violate
the Williams Act because the offeror made full disclosure.
1 26
Applying the Radol court's analysis, the Dan River court correctly con-
cluded that Icahn's two-tier tender offer did not violate the Williams Act's
company by encouraging shareholders to tender to the white knight instead of to the unfriendly
tender offeror. Id.
116. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 375 (6th Cir. 1981) (lock-up option




120. See 701 F.2d at 288 n.10 (Dan River court noted criticism of Mobil decision); see also
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (deception necessary predicate to § 14(e)
allegation); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 629-30 (D. Md. 1982)
(Mobil fails to interpret Santa Fe's definition of manipulation as requiring deception to allege
§ 14(e) violation).








prohibition against manipulation in connection with any tender offer. 27 Like
the front-end loaded offer in Radol, Icahn's two-tier tender offer did not coerce
Dan River stockholders into tendering, nor did Icahn's two-tier offer deter
other offers for Dan River's stock.' 8 Although all tender offers are
manipulative, Congress decided that regulation of tender offers through the
disclosure provisions of the Williams Act, rather than a blanket prohibition,
would provide adequate protection for the investor."'2 Like the two-tier offers
in Radol and Cities Service but unlike the lock-up agreement in Mobil, Icahn's
two-tier tender offer was not manipulative and therefore did not violate sec-
tion 14(e) of the Williams Act.'30
In addition to concluding that Icahn's activities did not constitute securities
fraud, the Fourth Circuit examined whether Icahn violated RICO.' 3' A minority
of courts have required that a defendant be associated with organized crime
to support a RICO charge.' 32 The first case to require that a plaintiff
demonstrate that defendant had ties to organized crime arose in a federal mail
fraud case, Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc. 3 In Barr, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant, the nation's largest telephone answering service had overcharged
the plaintiff.' 34 The district court denied plaintiff's motion to amend the
127. See 701 F.2d at 287-89 (Icahn's two-tier tender offer probably not manipulative); see
also Radol, 534 F. Supp. at 1312-13 (two-tier pricing structure neither coercive nor manipulative).
128. See 701 F.2d at 287-89 (two-tier offer not coercive because district court's order gave
shareholders additional time to reconsider decision to tender); see id. (two-tier offer not manipulative
because Icahn made full disclosure of terms and conditions of offer and management's resistance
to offer).
129. See 701 F.2d at 288; Radol, 534 F. Supp. 1312 (Congress regulates not outlaws tender
offers); see also SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers - Report of Recommendations, [Current
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1028 (July 15, 1983). The SEC Advisory Committee con-
sidered whether two-tier offers should be prohibited. Id. The Committee acknowledged the coercive
elements inherent in two-tier tender offers and the potential for abuse in partial bids. Id. at 25.
Partial bids unlike a full bid for all of a company's securities are offers for only a portion of
a company's stock. Id. Two-tier offers are partial bids since such offers propose an initial offer
to purchase a specified number of securities at a specified price and propose an alternative offer
if the initial offer fails. Id. As a result of the Committee's examination, the Committee recom-
mended a regulatory disincentive to two-tier tender offers. Id. at 26. The Committee adopted
recommendation 16 which would require a longer minimum offering period for partial bids than
that required for full bids. Id. Recommendation 16 states that the minimum offering period for
a partial tender offer should be approximately two weeks longer than that prescribed for full
tender offers. Id.
130. See 701 F.2d at 284-89; Radol, 534 F. Supp. at 1312-13 (front end loaded offer not
manipulative); Cities Service, 541 F. Supp. at 1220 (two-tier offer not manipulative); but see
Mobil, 669 F.2d at 375 (lock up option manipulative).
131. See 701 F.2d at 289-91.
132. See Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defendant must
be member of organized crime because purpose of RICO statute is to curb organized crime);
Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (RICO act limited
to entities involved with organized crime or activities within the penumbra of organized crime);
Barr v. NVUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff must demonstrate
affirmatively that defendant connected with organized crime to support RICO charge).
133. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
134. Id. at 112-13.
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pleadings to include a RICO charge because the plaintiff failed to indicate
that the defendant had a connection with organized crime. 35
In contrast to Barr, the majority of courts have rejected a requirement
that a plaintiff demonstrate that a defendant had ties to organized crime. 136
For example, in United States v. Bledsoe'37 the Eighth Circuit held that no
statute could require nor did Congress intend the RICO statute to require direct
proof of involvement in something as ill defined as organized crime.' 3 In Bled-
soe, the government alleged that defendants associated with an enterprise which
fraudulently sold securities of agricultural cooperatives and that defendants
participated in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity in violation of RICO. 3 9 The Bledsoe court concluded that RICO did
not require a nexus with organized crime. 140
In addition to judicial authority, the RICO statute's legislative history
demonstrates that defendants need not be connected to organized crime to
allege a RICO violation.' Congress refused to limit application of RICO's
135. Id.
136. See Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,615, at 93,057 (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 1982) (no requirement that defendant be involved
with organized crime); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, 546 F. Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (no organized crime requirement in RICO), Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co.,
530 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (plaintiff need not demonstrate that defendant member
of organized crime); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (not necessary that
defendant connected to organized crime).
137. 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 456 (1982).
138. Id. at 663.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976) (no link
with organized crime necessary to invoke RICO). In Mandel, the Maryland district court squarely
addressed the issue whether the RICO statute applied only to members of organized crime. Id.
In Mandel, the court recognized that Congress' primary purpose in enacting the RICO statute
was to combat organized crime. Id.; see Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 92 reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073 (purpose of RICO to eradicate organized crime). The Mandel
court, however, noted that Congress rejected a number of proposals to define organized crime.
415 F. Supp. at 1018. The court concluded that Congress did not intend to require a link with
organized crime to invoke RICO. Id. at 1018-19.
The Mandel case, however, was a criminal RICO case. Id. The Mandel court distinguished
Barr as an action brought by a private litigant under RICO's civil provisions to conclude that
an organized crime requirement should not apply in a criminal prosecution. Id.; cf. Barr v.
WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (connection with organized crime re-
quired to invoke civil RICO). The Mandel court noted that Barr did not consider the legislative
history indicating that Congress did not intend RICO to apply exclusively to members of organized
crime. 415 F. Supp. at 1019. The Mandel analysis of a criminal RICO case, however, should
apply to private actions brought under RICO's civil provisions. The legislative history for both
the criminal and civil provisions of the RICO statute indicates that Congress did not intend to
limit RICO to individuals connected with organized crime. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970)
(remarks of Rep. Poff) (amendment limiting RICO to members of organized crime, specifically
limited to persons of Italian ancestry would be unconstitutional).
141. See 116 CONG. REc. 35,302 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (RICO statute does not
contain definition of organized crime to maintain flexibility in application of statute); see also
United States v. Uni Oil, 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981) (in criminal RICO case court held
[Vol. 41:491
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
statutory provisions to members of organized crime.' 2 Moreover, in United
States v. Turkette,4 3 the United States Supreme Court examined the legislative
history of the RICO statute and concluded that Congress was aware of the
scope of the statute. 14 The Court held that since Congress intended RICO
to have a broad scope, courts should not restrict application of the RICO
statute to persons connected with organized crime.'
45
The Fourth Circuit should not join the minority of courts requiring that
defendants be connected to organized crime to assert a RICO claim.'4 6 The
majority of courts hold that RICO's legislative history and statutory language
do not support a restriction of the RICO statute to members of organized
crime. 47 The Fourth Circuit should follow the Eighth Circuit's holding in Bled-
soe that Congress did not require a nexus with organized crime.'
4 8
In Dan River, the Fourth Circuit held that a target company had not
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits regarding a
number of alleged securities laws violations and an alleged violation of the
RICO statute to justify injunctive relief.'4 '9 The court's conclusion that Dan
River as a target company probably lacked standing to assert a claim under
the antifraud provisions of the '34 Act demonstrates the Fourth Circuit's reluc-
that nothing in history or language of RICO statute expressly limits application to members of
organized crime), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982).
142. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983) (nexus with organized crime not
necessary to invoke RICO). In Schacht, the Illinois State Director of Insurance alleged that defen-
dants continued an insurer in business past the insurer's point of insolvency and looted the in-
surer of the insurer's most profitable and least risky business, thereby aggravating the insurer's
insolvency. Id. at 1344-45. Examining RICO's legislative history, the Schacht court held that
Congress did not intend to limit RICO's statutory reach to persons involved with organized crime.
Id. at 1353-56.
143. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
144. Id. at 586-87. In Turkette, a criminal case, the Supreme Court held that neither the
language nor structure of RICO limited RICO's application to defendants that have infiltrated
legitimate enterprises. Id. The Court examined RICO's language and legislative history to con-
clude that Congress knew that the legislature was entering a new domain of federal involvement
by enacting RICO. Id. As a result of Congress' knowledge of the scope of RICO, the Supreme
Court concluded that courts have no authority to restrict RICO's application. Id.
145. Id.
146. See RICO-Securities Violations, supra note 5, at 437 (restricting RICO to only persons
associated with organized crime necessarily restricts statute's utility as weapon against organized
crime); see also Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95
HAgv. L. Rav. 1101, 1106-09 (1982) (c6 urts should not restrict RICO to persons affiliated with
organized crime).
147. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-54 (7th Cir. 1983) (enumerating decisions
of courts not restricting RICO to members of organized crime).
148. See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 663 (8th Cir. 1982) (Congress did not re-
quire link to organized crime to invoke RICO); see also RICO - Securities Violations, supra note
5, at 437 (restricting RICO to members of organized crime contrary to judicial authority and
legislative history); Civil RICO, supra note 139, at 1120-21 (courts should not limit RICO liability
based on determination of which defendants connected with organized crime).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 25-79 (Fourth Circuit's analysis of Dan River's
likelihood of success on merits).
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